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Local autonomy in a subnational jurisdiction is more likely to be gained,
secured or enhanced where there are palpable movements or political
parties agitating for independence in these smaller territories. A closer
look at the fortunes, operations and dynamics of independence parties
from subnational island jurisdictions can offer some interesting insights
on the appetite for sovereignty and independence, but also the lack
thereof, in the twenty-ﬁrst century.
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Introduction: the iron law of independence?
History was in the making when the Republic of South Sudan became an inde-
pendent state on 9 July 2011, was welcomed as the 193rd member of the United
Nations (UN) on 14 July, and joined the Africa Union on 28 July. This new
country has strong claims to its current status; long struggles to maintain inde-
pendence from encroaching European powers in the nineteenth century; run for
some time as a separate region within the colony of Egypt; ﬁghting two civil
wars since the independence of Sudan in 1956; bearing considerable neglect
from the central Sudanese government; and approving, by a whopping 98
per cent majority, the decision to secede as a separate state in a January 2011
referendum (voter turnout: 97 per cent). Substantial oil deposits provide con-
siderable economic potential to this nascent sovereign state.
ISSN 1466-2043 print/ISSN 1743-9094 online
# 2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2012.729735
http://www.tandfonline.com
∗Corresponding author. Email: gbaldacchino@upei.ca
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics
Vol. 50, No. 4, November 2012, 555–568
South Sudan is the latest country to emerge from the wave of decolonisa-
tion. Aspirations for autonomy, the removal of long years of oppression,
laced with increasingly acceptable overtures to national identity, provided suc-
cessful recipes for the transitioning to full independence, with the blessing of
the international community. Former powers – as in the case of Sudan with
regards to South Sudan – may resist this transition (possibly by the use of vio-
lence and military action), and they can ﬂex whatever international clout they
might possess in order to sway signiﬁcant players in the region not to support
aspirations for independence. For instance Palestine’s bid to be recognised as a
sovereign state at and by the UN in 2011 is moot. If all else fails, countries may
still decide not to recognise jurisdictions even if they should declare themselves
independent: at the time of writing, the sovereign state of Kosovo has been
recognised by 83 other sovereign states.
But such an observation suggests that all potential countries would become
independent if they could. This is not the case.
Contrast the South Sudan referendum with another event that took place,
also in Africa, a few months before. On 31 March 2011, the island of
Mayotte, in the Indian Ocean, became France’s 101st department and its 5th
overseas department. Mayotte is also likely to become an Overseas Region
of the European Union (EU) in 2014. Mayotte voted not to join its three neigh-
bouring islands to independence in 1975 (as the Republic of the Comoros), a
move interpreted by France to maintain its tutelage over the island. On 29
March 2009, in the referendum to decide whether or not Mayotte should
become a French department, 95.2 per cent of Mahorais voters were in
favour (voter turnout: 61 per cent) (Larned, 2011).
The case of Mayotte reminds us of another category of (largely small and
self-governing) jurisdictions that may not wish to assume the mantle of full
sovereignty. Indeed, there has been a sharp decline in the pursuit of sovereignty
by sub-state regions and stateless nations that form part of larger multi-level
states. The aims of subnational territorial movements, spearheaded by stateless
nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs), tend to reﬂect a desire to embark on
innovative autonomy arrangements that fall short of full sovereignty. But why
choose something other than statehood?
Historical unfolding
Starting with Ethiopia in 1941, no less than 129 countries have achieved inde-
pendence in the last 70 years. This massive wave of decolonisation has been
spearheaded by former colonies pressing for, and achieving, full sovereignty,
as well as by the breakup of morally bankrupt empires (Soviet Union, Yugosla-
via) in the face of agitations for self-determination by peoples who saw them-
selves as dispossessed, stateless nations. There remains today no shortage of
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potential candidates for independence: the UN Special Committee on Decolo-
nisation (the Committee of 24) still monitors 16, ‘non-self governing terri-
tories’ (all but two being islands). There are hundreds of stateless regions
and nations clamouring recognition, increased autonomy, and/or outright full
sovereignty. And yet, certainly amongst the smallest of these and various
other (mainly island or archipelagic) territories, there is perhaps not much appe-
tite for independence. Instead, most of these jurisdictions have decided that
they would rather retain some aspects of autonomy while maintaining or
seeking better terms of integration with their metropolitan/colonial power.
Many subnational regions and stateless nations are not interested in seces-
sion, and would have conﬁrmed this in various independence referenda.
Indeed, in a practice that can be dated back certainly as far as 1204 CE (in the
case of the Channel Islands), various sub-national jurisdictions have secured
or stuck to their autonomy status, and in some cases enhanced it. These
include Denmark’s Faroe Islands and Greenland, France’s Mayotte, China’s
Hong Kong and Macau, and New Zealand’s Cook Islands: they have beneﬁtted
from measures of self-government – often not shared by other component units
of the polity – while remaining comfortably lodged within the purview of a
larger, richer, metropolitan state. Indeed, there has been a growing acceptance
on the part of states that multiple tiers of government can lead to better policy
making (thereby precipitating plans for the decentralisation or devolution of
powers to subnational jurisdictions); whilst on the part of the subnational juris-
dictions themselves, the beneﬁts of maintaining a form of association with a
larger state (be it ‘free association’ or ‘sovereignty-association’) often outweigh
the risks associated with complete separation.
The advantages of afﬁliation, and the perils of independence – depending,
of course, on one’s point of view – are starkly evident in the following cases
from recent decades, all drawn from the UK’s Overseas Territories: catastrophic
volcanic eruptions (Montserrat, Tristan da Cunha); the ﬁnancing of expensive
infrastructure projects, such as an international airport (St Helena); political
corruption (Turks and Caicos); a banking scandal (Montserrat); the provision
of security in the face of an invasion by another state (Falklands); and the
rule of law in the face of rampant child abuse (Pitcairn).
Tweaking a relationship
One key distinction between locales agitating for full independence and those
stubbornly resisting it concerns the nature of the ‘small peripheral territory
versus metropolis’ relationship. An identiﬁable region that lacks jurisdictional
capacity, struggling against deliberate or perceived discrimination and repres-
sion from a larger rapacious state, feeling itself to be a disempowered or
abused minority on economic, linguistic, cultural or ethnic grounds, and
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solidifying its identity claims with a suitable history and ontology, is more
likely to breed overt and covert political resistance. This situation could
spawn movements that could consider and present secession and independence
as desirable political options, and fan popular sentiment in their favour. Seces-
sionist parties in such territories would encourage the adoption of such a nar-
rative. But what is seen as a benign patron state, perhaps keen to maintain
the smaller unit within its purview, would be disposed to support its wards
with welfare, employment, security, investment and other beneﬁts, perhaps
even citizenship, proving to one and all that their union pays dividends; that
theirs is not a colonial, imperial or unequal relationship. These are classic strat-
egies of ‘territorial management’, whereby states seek to accommodate the
interests and demands of subnational regions in order to ward off the threat
of secession and strengthen the unity of the state (Keating, 1988). Indeed, if ter-
ritorial management strategies for different subnational regions are unequal or
asymmetric, it is usually to the advantage of the smaller unit.
Elites, and the general public, in many small territories have mobilised in
support of such an evolving relationship with a former colonial power; prefer-
ring this to the alternative of independence. The latter could, in practice, lock in
a status of being alone, poor and destitute in a harsh and unforgiving world. But
it could also mean locking into an unhappy, political subservience with a
different, larger, closer power. So little Anguilla in 1968 seceded from St
Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, preferring to remain a colony of London than a colony
of Basseterre. Mayotte has emphatically preferred Paris to Moroni, the
capital of neighbouring Comoros. The Dutch Antilles also broke up because
its constituent parts would rather be directly subordinate to distant Amsterdam
than to neighbouring Willemstad, in Curac¸ao. In these and similar cases, the
metropolitan power may be complicit in facilitating this move: historically,
of the former colonial powers, France has probably been keenest to maintain
its empire, and co-opt its wards via assimilation (Guadeloupe, Martinique,
French Guiana and Re´union from as early as 1946). With its numerous overseas
departments and territories (and mainly islands) scattered all over the planet,
France possesses the second-largest Exclusive Economic Zone in the world,
covering 11,035,000 km2, only just behind the USA (with 11,351,000 km2).
Of course, in the struggle for loyalty and legitimacy, a state sympathetic to
the smaller territory’s continued integration and perseverance within the status
quo would look nervously at any movements agitating for secession; so also
would the politico-economic elites of the smaller unit (unless they themselves
were pro-independence). The existence of, and extent of popular support for
SNRPs within the smaller territory can indeed act as a barometer of overall sat-
isfaction, or disappointment, with the territory-metropole relationship. With
this in mind, SNRPs may not necessarily have full sovereignty in their
sights, or only perhaps as a long-term goal. Tweaking the relationship with
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the metropole in their favour may be a more immediate, and more reachable,
policy objective.
This observation is becoming increasingly accepted in the literature on
SNRPs. Rather than pursue outright independence, many SNRPs prefer forms
of enhanced autonomy within the state (Tu¨rsan, 1998; Elias, 2008). However,
constitutional restructuring is not the only goal of these movements. Such
parties seek the general aim of ‘territorial empowerment’, which includes
seeking to enhance the political, socioeconomic and cultural capacity of the
region, often within the framework of the state (Hepburn, 2009). The presence
and activities of independence-leaning movements can contribute signiﬁcantly
to a more successful negotiation with, and securing of even more generous
measures of autonomy and capacity from,metropolitan powers. This is especially
true when SNRPs can exploit the existence of a distinct history, culture, language
and identity to form the basis of their nationalist discourse and claims for self-
determination (Keating, 1988; Elias, 2008; Hepburn, 2009). This mobilisation
can also be facilitated by the existence of autonomy arrangements which
enable the territory to ﬂex its capacity, and potential for even more self-govern-
ment, as a political entity. In some cases, territories are bracing for eventual inde-
pendence referenda (Bougainville, New Caledonia, Scotland) or may entertain
fresh referenda for the same purpose (Tokelau, Nevis).
Greenland/Kalaallit Nunaat has held a non-binding referendum on
enhanced autonomy in November 2008, which was passed with a 75 per
cent approval (turnout: 72 per cent). Its proposals – which the Danish Parlia-
ment has promised to honour – are to expand home rule in 30 areas; give
Greenland a say in foreign policy and a more deﬁnite split of future oil
revenue; make Greenlandic the sole ofﬁcial language; phase out Greenland’s
generous subsidies from Copenhagen; and recognise Greenlanders as a separ-
ate people under international law. Like Greenland, the Faroe Islands, are also
working through a ‘step by step’ process that could lead to independence, aided
by the presence of SNRPs in regional governments. But the situation is differ-
ent in another Scandinavian territory. The A˚land Islands complain that Helsinki
remains indifferent or even hostile to requests for greater autonomy: there is no
likelihood for an enhanced autonomy referendum there. Does the small, inde-
pendence-leaning, political party in A˚land justify Helsinki’s stance? Maria
Ackre´n and Bjarne Lindstro¨m explain the different dynamics behind these
three Scandinavian independence movements in their contribution to this
collection.
Who needs independence?
Strong arguments – cultural, ﬁscal, economic and political – in favour of inde-
pendence remain. Many can arise out of sheer frustration with existing
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autonomy arrangements. Should these be interpreted by the public, or its elites,
as similar to the oppression that characterised many colonial relationships, then
agitation for independence can be expected. And yet, the drive for indepen-
dence a` la vingtie`me sie`cle has practically ground to a snail’s pace; and this
is worthy of some reﬂection.
First, such an ‘inﬁnite pause’ is partly due to the changing nature of states in
a post-Westphalian system. On one hand, the international system grants con-
siderable powers and legitimacy to existing states, themselves embroiled in an
intricate web of bilateral and multilateral treaties. With few exceptions, like
Antarctica or Svalbard, ‘three-dimensional national cages’ (Palan, 2003: 97)
of contiguous territorial states dominate the system. Any aspiring new state
today would not only need to be hived off from an existing state that would
be expected to feverishly oppose its recognition by other states in the system
(Serbia with regard to Kosovo being a recent example); it would also have to
contend with the general challenge of ‘extantism’ (the status quo of states).
In another sense, though, the nature of statehood is itself changing, whereby
states have lost their capacity for being the only important units for political
decision-making. State sovereignty is being eroded from below by decentrali-
sation, and from above by globalisation and supranational integration. This has
made statehood a less attractive goal for some subnational actors, who have
sought to exploit the political spaces beneath, above and between states to
advance their political projects.
Second, new opportunities for subnational mobilisation have been created
within the context of deepening supranational integration. This is most obvious
in Europe. European networks, lobbying organisations and institutions have
been set up to strengthen the rights and recognition of sub-state institutions,
such as establishment of the EU Committee of the Regions in 1994. This
new institutional space adds further incentive to regions to organise themselves
and agitate as such, often meaning to circumvent their national governments
(e.g. Keating, 2005). Yet involvement in a ‘Europe of the Regions’ is not the
only option available to subnational movements; the security afforded by EU
membership may also make the drive for full sovereignty more appealing –
as evidenced by the ‘independence in Europe’ platform of the Scottish National
Party (SNP).
There are numerous SNRPs, also described as ‘ethno-regionalist parties’
(Tu¨rsan, 1998; Miodownik & Cartrite, 2006), in Europe today that command
signiﬁcant public support, and even participate in national governing
coalitions. Many have moved from fringe/niche/pariah status to mainstream
political players, with all the challenges that this shift from ‘protest to
power’ entails (Hepburn, 2009). Perhaps counter-intuitively, the drive for
wholesale independence may have been dampened by this shift to the main-
stream. The co-optation of such parties into national politics, and the granting
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of some of their requests for devolution, may have been part of a ‘territorial
management’ strategy by metropolitan powers to detract support for secession
(Of course, this strategy could backﬁre, as appears to be the case with Scotland
and the recent rise in popularity of the SNP, though not necessarily a rise in
support for independence).
Indeed, demands for independence have becomemore andmore uncommon
amongst the SNRPs of Europe. Rather than clamour for full sovereignty, the
majority of SNRPs have, over time, opted for creative forms of shared sover-
eignty within an integrationist Europe (Hepburn, 2010). This is reﬂected in
the composition and autonomy claims of the European Free Alliance, the
premier alliance of SNRPs in the EU. Most members seek to renegotiate their
autonomywithin a ‘Europe of the Peoples andNations’, rather than demand sep-
arate membership of a ‘Europe of States’ (Hooghe, 1996; Loughlin, 1996;
Jeffery, 2002;Keating, 2005; Elias, 2008;Hepburn, 2010). This accommodation
strategy is also seen in the realpolitik of fringe independentist parties – as cur-
rently exist in the Balearic Islands (Catalonia/Spain), Corsica (France) and Sar-
dinia (Italy). In his contribution to this collection,Andre´ Fazimeticulously charts
how independence-leaning parties in these three sub-national island jurisdictions
(SNIJs) can still impact on public policy, especially by increasing the polaris-
ation and fragmentation amongst nationalist parties of various dispositions.
Third, and somewhat ironically, at a time when the international relations
climate is increasingly safe to states qua states, irrespective of size (e.g. Bart-
mann, 1992), there are clear economic and security advantages in being associ-
ated with a larger, richer, metropolitan patron. Throughout the twentieth
century, only three states have been assimilated with/by neighbours, and thus
disappeared: South Yemen (into Yemen), Zanzibar (merged with Tanganyika
to form Tanzania) and Somaliland (in Somalia – though, to be fair, we may
yet see a resurgence of the successor to the former British protectorate).
Thus, once an entity is a recognised (even if subnational or neo/post-colonial)
jurisdiction, the security bestowed by the very act of statehood is a tantalising
prospect. What today are referred to as ‘failed states’ would easily have been, in
the past, ripe for invasion and assimilation by covetous neighbouring powers;
this is not so much the case nowadays.
And yet, security can mean different things to different people: falling under
the aegis of a larger, more powerful state, while maintaining strong levels of
domestic autonomy, has its own advantages. Perhaps, even an envious situation
of ‘having the cake and eating it too’ (Palan, 1998): all (or most) of the ceremo-
nial, symbolic, regulatory and operational trappings of sovereignty, plus a much
stronger ally in the corner for those delicate occasions that warrant a display of
force or inﬂuence, a source of economic largesse, a pool of potential tourists, a
custodian of a lucrative and diverse labour market, an appealing location for pur-
suing higher education, and purveyor of prized citizenship rights. The evidence
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is telling: globally, the citizens of SNIJs have a per-capita income almost three
times higher than those in small island developing states (SIDS) (McElroy &
Sandborn, 2005). In their contribution to this collection, Jerome L. McElroy
and Courtney E. Parry systematically outline how SNIJs have consistently
‘done’ better in relation to comparable ‘SIDS’ on a broad range of demographic,
epidemiological, social and economic indicators over recent decades. The ques-
tion is thus posed: is it worth being sovereign? Tellingly, various peoples are
agitating for ‘home unions’ that would allow them increased local autonomy
but without rescinding their current incorporation within an existing sovereign
state. As Sir John Swan, former Premier of Bermuda – since 1999 the largest
(by population) of the UK’s 14 Overseas Territories – famously put it in
1982: ‘With the Americans to feed us and the British to defend us, who
needs independence?’ (cited in Connell, 1994).
The Caribbean is a case in point, as reviewed by Peter Clegg in his contri-
bution to this collection: between 1967 and 2007, various referenda have been
held: in Bermuda, US Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico (three times), Bonaire, Sint
Maartin, Saba, Curac¸ao, St Eustatius . . . none have endorsed sovereignty. We
have noted how tiny Anguilla actually seceded from St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla
and preferred to remain a colony of Britain. Antigua and Barbuda and St
Kitts-Nevis were the last to join the list of sovereign states in the region, secur-
ing independence in 1981 and 1983 respectively. Why have none ‘graduated’
since? Do the names of both these countries betray an uncomfortable and ﬁckle
union, liable to ﬁssion? Do subnational island autonomies, like Nevis and
Tobago, with their independence movements and distinct ethno-territorial iden-
tities, perceive that they may be better off as dependencies of other states rather
than sovereign units?
A different kind of sovereignty
Given this background, we propose that the dynamics for any moves for pol-
itical independence in the twenty-ﬁrst century may be different from those of
the twentieth. True, there will still be peoples whose main goal will be to rid
themselves of what they experience as illegitimate oppression: dare we
suggest Aceh, Chechnya, Irian Jaya and Kurdistan? The ﬁssion of former
empires may yet continue. But, the aspirations of subnational regions and colo-
nies to independence is grinding to a halt, and in the rare cases that they still
exist, such aspirations for independence are increasingly driven by hardnosed,
strategic and pragmatic economic arguments. Meanwhile, both creative gov-
ernance and ﬁscal vicissitudes have already ushered in examples of ‘sovereign
states’ that approximate suzerain entities. Note Palau, the Marshall Islands and
the Federated States of Micronesia: the three ‘Compact’ States in the Paciﬁc,
‘hybrid jurisdictions’ (Levine & Roberts, 2005) that have relinquished their
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international relations to the USA; or three other Paciﬁc countries – Kiribati,
Nauru and Papua New Guinea – becoming ‘offshore processing centres’ for
those seeking asylum status in Australia. Political parties, sensitive to voters’
wishes and concerns, may be keen to achieve a different kind of sovereignty,
one that secures enhanced local autonomy (and especially in certain sensitive
areas of policy); but ultimately maintains a special relationship with a benevo-
lent patron. This is the case for Puerto Rico with the USA; Aruba with the Neth-
erlands; Mayotte with France; Turks and Caicos with the UK, Hong Kong with
China, and Greenland/ Kalaallit Nunaat with Denmark.
Referring to ‘a different kind of sovereignty’ invariably brings to mind
‘sovereignty association’, a ‘modiﬁed’ version of independence conceived in
the late 1960s by the Mouvement Souverainete´-Association (MSA) set up by
Rene´ Le´vesque to reform relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada.
The MSA succeeded in uniting the sovereigntist-leaning political forces in
Quebec as the Parti Que´be´cois (PQ), which won the provincial elections in
1976, and triggered two nail-biting provincial referenda (in 1980 and 1995)
about the future of Quebec-Canada relations. The appeal for a secessionist-
leaning political agenda in Quebec appears to have been revived of late, with
the election of a (albeit minority) PQ Government in 2012; but, meanwhile,
the province appears to have waned of late, it is clear that Quebec has
greatly expanded its provincial jurisdictional reach, while persisting as a recog-
nised ‘nation within a united Canada’ (CBC News, 2006). The province has a
near monopoly of competence in policy ﬁelds like culture, health, language,
immigration and education (e.g. Gagnon, 2009). How was this accomplished?
Not by a dramatic referendum, but incrementally, a` la piece.
Another example of ‘a different kind of sovereignty’ is that of the Cook
Islands. Like Niue, the Cooks are a self-governing state in free association
with New Zealand, and a full member of the 16-member Paciﬁc Islands
Forum. The Cook Islands Government enjoys full executive powers; it has
established separate diplomatic relations with over 20 states at the embassy
or high commission level; and 23 states (including Australia, New Zealand
and the USA, as well as the EU) maintain full diplomatic relations accredited
to the Cook Islands. Cook Islanders retain New Zealand citizenship: herewith a
state that does not confer citizenship. The Cooks are not members of the UN;
yet, their citizens can ‘enjoy all the prerogatives of sovereignty with the most
permissive and generous arrangements for international relations available to
any dependent territory in the world’ (Bartmann, 2008: 72).
Island cases
The reference to the Cooks alerts us to another particularity of this volume: we
are only dealing here with independence movements on islands. It is well
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known that islands can inform us about such dynamics as decolonisation, post-
colonialism, globalisation, para-diplomacy and other variations around the
sovereignty theme generally. Their pedigree as ‘enclave meta-geographies’
(Sidaway, 2007), evocative platforms to various disciplinary concerns and pur-
suits – whether it is evolutionary biology, social anthropology or, more
recently, green energy and climate change – is widely acknowledged.
Secondly, islands represent quintessential platforms for nation-states, since as
delineated spaces, discrete bounded territories that are at once knowable
and, because of their consolidated form, readily defensible, they function as
ideal embodiments of the state’s relationship to the nation (Peckham, 2003:
503). The ﬁnite island geography aids the nurturing of a sense of identity that
is contiguous with territory (Srebrnik, 2004; Anckar, 2005; Baldacchino,
2005); perhaps one strong explanation for the existence of only a dozen or so
inhabited islands in the world divided between more than one country (Royle,
2001: 150–152; Baldacchino, 2013). Thirdly, islands and archipelagos also con-
stitute by far the largest number of small states, as well as of colonial remnants:
the CIAWorld Factbook lists 267 ‘countries, dependent areas, and other entities’,
of which about one-third (85) are islands or archipelagos (CIA, 2011). ‘Below a
population size of 5 million, there is a striking correlation between diminishing
size and the salience of island entities’ (Bertram & Poirine, 2007: 327).
Speciﬁcally within Europe, islands are not overly well-represented at the
top table of the EU: the Council of Ministers. Although the EU does have
some small island state members – Cyprus, Malta, and a larger, part-island,
Republic of Ireland, with Iceland recently constituting a candidate member –
Europe has not witnessed the establishment of an independent island state
for some time. And yet, the number of ultra-peripheral regions of the EU has
increased: all of these, but one (French Guyana), are islands. Does this mean
that the era of island independence has, for the time being, passed in Europe,
while island autonomy is all the rage? The SNRPs operating in Europe’s
numerous SNIJs (Baldacchino, 2006) – such as A˚land, Azores, the Canaries,
Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily – may be seeking something other than indepen-
dence. If so, the dynamics behind this behaviour call for a better understanding,
especially in comparing this phenomena with ‘mainland’ territories.
Continental contrasts
Indeed, the European theatre is insightful for one other set of examples: the small
continental microstates. Four small continental European jurisdictions have lin-
gered for centuries as autonomous entities with clear ties to larger states; all are
now members of the UN (with a ﬁfth, the Holy See, as a permanent observer).
None are members of the EU; four of these ﬁve use the euro as their currency.
(The exception is Liechtenstein, which has been using the Swiss Franc since
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1920.) The sovereignty of Andorra, Liechtenstein,Monaco and SanMarino, and
their unfolding on the world stage – with larger Luxembourg as a role model –
suggests that size is no longer an obstacle to sovereignty.And independence does
pay dividends; but possibly only so when its opportunities – for visibility, for
participation in international initiatives, for representation – can be adequately
and consistently ﬁnanced. Location, in this case, also helps to facilitate mobility
and defray travel costs. As Barry Bartmann convincingly argues in his contri-
bution to this collection, the world’s 10 smallest island states (each with popu-
lations of 100,000 or less) profess a much more subdued role and constricted
reach as independent states than any of their smaller but much richer European
continental counterparts. The largest of these 10 by population, Kiribati, lacks a
permanent representative at the UNHQ in New York. Its very existence as a ter-
ritorial state is threatened by sea level rise.
In his contribution to this collection, Stephen Levine conﬁrms that, in the
Paciﬁc, ‘uncompetitive economic prospects and performance often mock the
trappings of sovereignty, self-rule and independence’. In this context, Levine
echoes Bartmann (see above), suggesting that the ‘free association’ that the
Cook Islands secured with New Zealand is a smart compromise. Like Niue,
the Cooks cannot achieve full sovereignty when the ﬁnancial assistance pro-
vided by New Zealand is required for its government to meet its budgetary
needs. Nor may it wish to. Cook Islanders do not have their own separate citi-
zenship; but then, is the absence of UN membership a high price to pay in
exchange for what Levine calls ‘semi-sovereignty’, and which comes along
with a permanent life-line to Wellington, where most Cook Islanders are
already domiciled? Of the last island territories to achieve independence in
the Paciﬁc, only East Timor can be said to match the classic twentieth
century mould: like South Sudan, it has escaped from the clutches of what
has been widely perceived as an oppressive regime. The other three are the
‘Compact States’ of Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of
Micronesia. While recognised as independent (including UN membership),
they are in ‘free association’ with their former, and most recent, protector:
the USA. What this means is that the USA provides ﬁnancial assistance over
renewable periods, in exchange for the right to operate its armed forces in
Compact areas, to demand land for operating bases (subject to negotiation),
and to exclude the militaries of other nations other than with its permission.
Like the USA, France still behaves as an imperial power: it maintains ter-
ritories in every part of the world. Integration into the centralised French
‘nation state’ has however not always been met (as in Mayotte) by acquiescent
and grateful subjects in its various far-ﬂung de´partements and collectivite´s
d’outre mer. This is especially so in the French Paciﬁc: as Nathalie Mrgudovic
outlines in her contribution to this collection, the independence struggles in
New Caledonia have been violent, and an independence referendum is
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planned there; while there is a strong independence movement on French
Polynesia. And yet, in both jurisdictions, considering sovereignty ‘in free-
association’ with France now appears to be a perfectly conceivable option.
Epilogue: what’s next?
Securing independence may be the culmination of a political project; and the
beginning of a new state. But it does not necessarily have to stop there. Juris-
dictions are works in progress. A domino effect may be set off, with smaller and
smaller entities going their own way from what had earlier appeared to be a
stable state or viable federal arrangement: thus was the unravelling of the
West Indies Federation. And yet, the candidates for such a spectacular ﬁssion
need not be conﬁned to imperial remnants: the very heart of empire may be
also affected. The British Isles include a diverse set of ‘countries’, counties,
islands and archipelagos that enjoy different degrees of autonomy: from the off-
shore ﬁnance driven ‘crown colonies’ of the Channel Islands; to the oil-rich
municipality of Shetland. Should the SNP, in power in Scotland at the time
of writing, hold and ‘win’ its promised independence referendum, would this
catalyse political ﬁssion across the UK? The real prospects of an independent
Scotland could, for example, easily affect the status and political aspirations of
Shetland, Orkney and the Western Isles (would they rather be wards of London
than of Edinburgh?) as well as the Isle of Man, Jersey, Guernsey, Wales and
Northern Ireland. Yet, the most likely outcome of the SNP’s proposed referen-
dum on independence is the option of ‘independence-lite’ or ‘devolution max’
which mimics the sovereignty-association model. A vote in favour of this
option, argues the SNP, would also be seen as a victory for the party as it con-
stitutes a further step towards the unravelling of the UK along post-sovereignty
lines. As documented in the contribution by Britt Cartrite to this collection, it
appears that it is high time to start conceiving of an alternative to the current
‘United Kingdom’.
References
Anckar, D. (2005) Decentralisation in microstates: where, how and why? Canadian
Review of Studies in Nationalism, 32(1–2), pp. 109–120.
Baldacchino, G. (2005) The contribution of social capital to economic growth: lessons
from island jurisdictions, The Round Table: Commonwealth Journal of
International Affairs, 94(378), pp. 35–50.
Baldacchino, G. (2006) Innovative development strategies from non-sovereign island
jurisdictions: a global review of economic policy and governance practices,
World Development, 34(5), pp. 852–867.
Baldacchino, G. (2013) A Political Economy of Divided Islands: Uniﬁed Geographies,
Splitting Polities (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
566 G. Baldacchino and E. Hepburn
Bartmann, B. (1992) Lilliput Revisited: Small States in a Changing World. Monograph
(Charlottetown, Canada: Institute of Island Studies, University of Prince Edward
Island). Available at http://www.upei.ca/iis/art_bb_2 (accessed 5 October 2012).
Bartmann, B. (2008) In or out: sub-national island jurisdictions and the antechamber of
para-diplomacy, in: G. Baldacchino & D. Milne (Eds) The Case for Non-sover-
eignty: Lessons from Sub-national Island Jurisdictions, pp. 57–75 (London:
Routledge).
Bertram, G. & Poirine, B. (2007) Island political economy, in: G. Baldacchino (Ed.) A
World of Islands: An Island Studies Reader, pp. 323–378 (Charlottetown, Canada:
Institute of Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island Luqa Malta Agenda
Academic).
CBC News. (2006) House passes motion recognizing Que´be´cois as nation, November
27. Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2006/11/27/nation-vote.
html (accessed 28 August 2011).
CIA. (2011)World Factbook (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency). Available
at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed 28
August 2011).
Connell, J. (1994) Britain’s Caribbean colonies: the end of the era of decolonisation?,
Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 32(1), pp. 87–106.
Elias, A. (2008)Minority Nationalist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative
Study (London: Routledge).
Gagnon, L. (2009) Quebec’s slow road to sovereignty, The Globe and Mail, June 16,
A11. Available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/article1180738.
ece (accessed 28 August 2011).
Hepburn, E. (2009) Introduction: re-conceptualising sub-state mobilisation, Regional &
Federal Studies, 19(4–5), pp. 477–499.
Hepburn, E. (2010) Small worlds in Canada and Europe: a comparison of regional party
systems in Quebec, Bavaria and Scotland, Regional & Federal Studies, 20(4–5),
pp. 527–544.
Hooghe, L. (Ed.) (1996) Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-
level Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Jeffery, C. (2002) Social and regional interests: ESC and the committee of the regions,
in: J. Peterson & M. Shackleton (Eds) The Institutions of the European Union,
pp. 326–346 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Keating, M. (1988) State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the
European State (Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf).
Keating, M. (Ed.) (2005) Regions and Regionalism in Europe (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar).
Larned,M. (2011) The newest French department,World Policy Blog, April 14. Available
at http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2011/04/14/newest-french-department (accessed
28 August 2011).
Levine, S. & Roberts, N. S. (2005) The constitutional structures and electoral systems
of Paciﬁc island states, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 43(3),
pp. 276–295.
Loughlin, J. (1996) Representing regions in Europe: the committee of the regions,
Regional & Federal Studies, 6(2), pp. 147–165.
McElroy, J. L. & Sandborn, K. (2005) The propensity for dependence in small
Caribbean and Paciﬁc islands, Bank of Valletta Review (Malta), 31(1), pp. 1–16.
Miodownik, D. & Cartrite, B. (2006) Demarcating political space: territoriality and the
ethno-regional party family, Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, 12(1), pp. 53–82.
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 567
Palan, R. (1998) Trying to have your cake and eating it: how and why the state system
has created offshore, International Studies Quarterly, 42(4), pp. 625–643.
Palan, R. (2003) The Offshore World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places and Nomad
Millionaires (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
Peckham, R. S. (2003) The uncertain state of islands: national identity and the discourse
of islands in nineteenth-century Britain and Greece, Journal of Historical
Geography, 29(4), pp. 419–515.
Royle, S. A. (2001) A Geography of Islands: Small Island Insularity (London:
Routledge).
Sidaway, J. D. (2007) Enclave space: a new metageography of development?, Area,
39(3), pp. 331–339.
Srebrnik, H. F. (2004) Small island nations and democratic values,World Development,
32(2), pp. 329–342.
Tu¨rsan, H. (1998) Ethnoregionalist parties as ethnic entrepreneurs, in: L. De Winter &
H. Tu¨rsan (Eds) Regionalist Parties in Western Europe, pp. 1–16 (London:
Routledge).
568 G. Baldacchino and E. Hepburn
